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Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and
worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The
decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies
and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-
stealing externality. Raising workers’ bargaining power resolves this inefficiency.
Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish
simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage
differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be
used for empirical testing.
∗Free University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, Address: Department of Economics, Free University
Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. email: gautier@tinbergen.nl
†SEO Economic Research, University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CEPR,. Address:
Roetersstraat 29, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. email: c.teulings@seo.nl
‡Free University Amsterdam, Address: Department of Economics, Free University Amsterdam, De
Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. email: vuuren@tinbergen.nl.
We thank participants of the conference on Labour market models and the matched employer-
employee data in Sandbjerg, the SED in Budapest, Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam, Maarten Janssen
and Robert Shimer, for their useful comments.
1 Introduction
Two out of every three jobs among young workers end within a year and the bulk of those
separations reflect job-to-job changes rather than layoffs, see Topel and Ward (1992).1
This suggests that there are search or information frictions in the labor market that
prevent worker types to immediately match with their optimal job type. Any model that
aims to give a good description of actual labor market flows should therefore allow for
job-to-job transitions. This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model
with a continuum of worker and job types.
Incorporating two-sided heterogeneity into a search model is useful because one of
the most important functions of the labor market is to find the right man for the job.
This optimal assignment problem obviously depends on the production technology. We
assume log supermodularity so that high skilled workers have a comparative advantage
in complex jobs. Then, a well functioning labor market sorts low skilled workers into the
simple jobs and high skilled workers into complex jobs. Search frictions frustrate this
process and make the assignment of workers to jobs imperfect.
This approach generates strong testable implications. If wages are determined by
Nash bargaining, they should for a given skill type be concave in job complexity: workers
earn most at their optimal assignment and earn less the further they are away from their
optimal assignment. Gautier and Teulings (2004) show that this is indeed the case for
the 6 OECD countries they consider. For the US, the cost of search frictions as a share of
total production is in the order of 25%. Alternatively, the cost of search can be derived
from the natural rate of unemployment. If the match surplus is shared equally and there
is no on-the-job search, unemployment, mismatch and the cost of vacancy creation each
make up for one third of the cost of search, see Teulings and Gautier (2004). Hence,
a natural rate of 5% implies that the cost of search is 15%, which is considerably less
than the 25% derived from the concavity of wages. On-the-job search can resolve this
inconsistency because it makes unemployed workers less choosy about their first job and
as a result the unemployment rate falls. The cost of search therefore becomes more than
three times the unemployment rate. On-the-job search also increases wage differentials
for workers with equal skill levels, mainly because unemployed job seekers increase the
range of job types that is acceptable for them. Therefore, the ratio of the cost of search
1Only for workers with less than a year of labor market experience the lay-off rate is larger than the
job-to-job transition rate.
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and wage differentials is lower with on-the-job search.
Finally, allowing for on-the-job search yields new empirical predictions regarding the
tenure distribution as a function of the quality of the match. This research program
results in a more reliable empirically backed estimate of the importance of search frictions
for the labor market.
On-the-job search also has important implications for efficiency. We find that when
off- and on-the-job search are equally efficient, unemployed job seekers accept all jobs that
pay more than the value of leisure and employed workers accept all jobs with a higher
wage than their current one. Therefore, workers behave socially optimally irrespective of
their bargaining power. In addition, we impose that vacancies do not cause congestion
on each other with respect to the meeting rate of possible job candidates. We show
that even then, firms create too many vacancies in the decentralized equilibrium due to
a business-stealing effect. When opening a vacancy, firms do not internalize the output
losses that a job switcher imposes on her previous employer. We find that this externality
is non-monotonic in the degree of search frictions. Starting from a situation with high
frictions, excess vacancy supply increases as search frictions become smaller. However,
for very low frictions, excess vacancy supply reduces again and in the limiting case of no
search frictions the measure of vacancies reduces to zero. Those results do not depend on
our specific contact technology. A constant returns contact technology only introduces
additional (congestion) externalities without eliminating the business-stealing externality
of the present paper.
The implications of on-the-job search for wage bargaining in search models have been
debated recently in Shimer (2005). Without on-the-job search, a larger piece of the cake
for the worker implies an equivalently smaller piece for the firm. This symmetry breaks
down when there is on-the-job search because the expected match duration is increasing
in the wage. Hence, firms are willing to pay a no-quit premium for good matches. This
makes the set of feasible pay offs of firms and workers possibly non-convex. Shimer shows
that a strategic bargaining game in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) may generate multiple
equilibria and that the wage that maximizes the product of worker and firm surpluses is
always an equilibrium. However, local maxima are also equilibria in his strategic game.
In this paper we also have potential non-convexities in the pay offs set. For many of the
special simplifying cases that we focus on, i.e. firms have all the bargaining power, those
problems do not occur.
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The analysis of a model with hierarchical two-sided sorting is a complicated affair.
In particular, the lower left and upper right corner of the matching space of skill and
complexity levels cause serious analytical problems. Teulings and Gautier (2004) approx-
imated the equilibrium for the model without on-the-job search by Taylor expansions
around the Walrasian assignment. This approach turned out not to work when we add
on-the-job search. Hence, we take a more convenient approach here. In Gautier et al.
(2005), we show that the approximated equilibrium in the hierarchical model has roughly
the same properties as the equilibrium of the circular model of Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999) with an increasing returns to scale contact technology. Since the circular model is
simpler than the hierarchical model, we introduce on-the-job search in the circular model.
There are a number of papers that are related to this one. Pissarides (1994) also studies
on-the-job search in a matching framework. His model differs from ours in at least 3 ways:
(1) he considers identical workers and two job types while we consider a continuum of
different workers and jobs, (2) unlike Pissarides’ model in our model the different worker
types do not cause congestion on each other, (3) in our model, wages either maximize the
Nash product or are an equilibrium to an alternating offer game while Pissarides assumes
a linear sharing rule. Barlevy (2002) has a model that is very similar to ours except that
in his model, wages are determined by a linear sharing rule, he uses a different contact
technology and his main results are based on simulations where we present analytical
solutions. His focus also differs from ours. He makes the important point that the
sullying effect of recessions (workers move slower to their optimal job types because of
low vacancy creation in recessions) dominates the positive cleansing effect of recessions for
realistic parameter values. As in Jovanovic (1979, 1984), our model predicts individual
separation probabilities to be decreasing in job tenure because the good matches are the
ones that survive. In a companion paper we give empirical evidence for this. Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) show that worker and job heterogeneity is not necessary for job-to-
job-movements. They show that the trade off between higher profits and a larger hiring
probability leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium for the firms. Finally, on-the-job search
in a bargaining environment is studied in Gautier (2002), Moscarini (2002, 2005), Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) and Burdett et al. (2004) but these papers either do not consider
ex ante heterogeneity or assume a different bargaining environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the assumptions and de-
rives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. In this section,
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we consider three cases: (i) no on-the-job search and positive bargaining power for the
workers, (ii) on- and off-the-job search equally efficient and firms have all the bargaining
power, (iii) on-the-job search is less efficient than off-the-job search and firms have all the
bargaining power. In Section 4 we conduct welfare analysis for those cases. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
The economy that we consider has the following properties.
Production
There is a continuum of worker types s and job types c; s and c are locations on a circle
with circumference 1, so that s = 1 is equivalent to s = 0, and the same for c. Workers can
only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity Y of a match only depends
on, the ”distance” between s and c: x(s, c) = mink∈Z |s− c+ k|. Hence: Y = Y (x). We
assume that Y (x) is twice differentiable and globally concave: Yxx(x) < 0, with an interior
maximum. Without loss of generality, this maximum is located at x = 0 and the value
of the maximum is normalized to unity: Y (0) = 1. Hence, x is a measure of the degree
of mismatch of an assignment. These assumptions imply that Yx (0) = 0, since x = 0
maximizes Y (x). We consider the simplest functional form that meets those criteria.
Y (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2.
We are interested in non-trivial equilibria where workers do not accept all jobs.2 The
parameter γ is related to the complexity dispersion parameter discussed in Teulings and
Gautier (2004: 558) and Teulings (2005). Low values of γ imply that worker types are
close substitutes.
Labor supply
We assume that labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference
of the circle and that, without loss of generality, total labor supply is normalized to one.
Hence, the density of type s is also equal to one. Unemployed workers receive a value of
leisure B. Employed workers supply a fixed amount of labor and their pay off is equal to
the wage they receive.
2This requires Y (x) < 0 for at least some x. Since 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
, a sufficient condition is γ > 8.
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Labor demand
There is free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The flow cost of maintaining a vacancy is
equal to K per period. After a vacancy is filled, the firm only pays for the wage of the
worker.
Job search technology
We assume a quadratic contact technology. Under these assumptions, the contact rate of
an unemployed worker is:
λ(s,unemployed)→c = λv (c) ,
and for a worker employed in a z-type job with a vacancy of type c it equals:
λ(s,employed in z)→c = ψλv (c)
where v (c) denotes the density of vacancies of type c per unit of the labor force and
where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 and λ > 0. The parameter ψ measures the efficiency of on-the-job
search relative to search while unemployed; ψ = 0 is the case with no on-the-job search,
as analyzed in Teulings and Gautier (2004); ψ = 1 is the case where off- and on-the-job
search are equally efficient. Since each contact between a particular type of worker with
a particular job is at the same time a contact of a particular job with a particular type
of worker, the contact rates of job types must therefore satisfy:
λc→(s,unemployed) = λu (s)
λc→(s,employed in z) = ψλe (s, z)
where u (s) denotes the density of unemployed workers of type s and where e (s, c) denotes
the density of type s workers employed in job type c, both per unit of the labor force. The
quadratic contact technology implies increasing returns to scale (IRS) and the absence of
congestion externalities: the number of unemployed u (s) or employed job seekers e (s, c)
does not enter into the contact rate for (un)employed workers and mutatis mutandis the
same applies for the number of vacancies v (c) in the contact rate of vacancies. Hence,
we can interpret the efficiency parameter λ as the scale of the labor market. The search
process is more efficient when the scale of the market is larger. The limiting case, λ →
∞, yields the Walrasian equilibrium. Teulings and Gautier (2004) give a number of
motivations for the IRS assumption. The main motivation is that it avoids congestion
effects between workers with very different skills. Another motivation is that it simplifies
the model.
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Job separation
Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at rate δ > 0.
Wage setting
We assume that wages are determined by bargaining between the worker and the firm
while firms cannot commit on future wage payments. Shimer (2005) argues that the
axiomatic Nash bargaining solution can no longer be applied in the presence of on-the-
job search because of non-convexities in the set of feasible pay offs. He shows that any
wage that locally maximizes the product of worker and firm surplus is an equilibrium
to a strategic game where workers and firms make alternating offers and the breakdown
rate goes to zero. We assume here that wages are set according to such a game. The
combination of bargaining and on-the-job search brings our model close to the wage
posting literature, i.e. Burdett and Mortensen (1988), and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003).
In both frameworks, firms pay ”no-quit” premiums, but only in the wage posting models
firms pay ”hiring premiums” (i.e. premiums that result in higher acceptance probabilities
from the worker side). In bargaining models where wages are continuously renegotiated,
hiring premiums are not credible because they will be immediately eliminated after hiring.
Workers anticipate this, and will therefore not respond to such premiums. Hence, firms
will not offer them in the first place.
Golden-growth path
We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate ρ > 0
is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. This assumption is only made for reasons
of tractability: it allows for an analytical solution of an integral which otherwise would
have to be computed numerically.3 Since the quadratic matching function implies IRS,
the growth of the labor force implies an upward trend in the efficiency of the search
process. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is an offsetting downward trend
in the efficiency of the market so that λ remains constant and the labor market does not
continuously become more efficient over time.4
3This problem also arises in wage posting models. The usual assumption made in these models is that
ρ/δ is infinitesimal (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). The same assumption would also be helpful in our
model, but we have chosen for the alternative representation of a golden-growth path.
4We can think of λ as consisting of a size-of-the-market part and a search efficiency part. We assume
that the product of both remains constant over time.
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Strategies of workers
Workers accept any job offer that yields a larger present value than the current job. If
workers receive a wage offer equal to their current wage they move with strictly positive
probability to the new firm.5
Strategies of the firms
A firm’s strategy is an entry decision and conditional on entering, a location on the unit
circle. We assume that firms do not know the realizations of the strategies of the other
firms and the realized matches. This implies that strategies can only be based on the
steady-state distribution of worker and firm locations. We consider the vacancy suppliers
to be ex ante identical and consider symmetric equilibria (identical firms play the same
strategy). Non-symmetric equilibria might exist but require a lot of coordination. Pure-
strategy equilibria do not exist in this setting because that would imply that all vacancies
would be located at the same spot. This cannot be an equilibrium since a single firm is
able to improve profits by posting vacancies at the other side of the circle.6 This implies
that we do not have to consider these pure-strategy equilibria.
In Gautier et al. (2005), we proof that given that the labor force is distributed uni-
formly along the circumference of the circle, vacancies must also be distributed uniformly:
v (c) = v. This proof is based on the assumption that there is no on-the-job search. We
will show that when we allow for on-the-job search, this uniform distribution of vacancies
is again an equilibrium, but we cannot proof that no other equilibria exist. However, we
do conjecture that the uniqueness result carries over to the case where ψ > 0. The intu-
ition behind this is that wages should be high at locations with relatively many vacancies.
This is due to both the increase in the outside option of the unemployed workers and
the increase in the ”no-quit” premium. The high wages at these locations suggest that
the value of a vacancy is relatively low there which violates the assumption of free entry.
Hence, a situation where some locations have more vacancies than others cannot be an
equilibrium. Since we focus on equilibria where both supply and demand are uniformly
distributed, all outcome variables do not depend on either s or c separately, but only
on the distance x between them. Hence, we use x as the only argument. For variables
depending only on either s or c, like v (c), we simply drop the argument. This simplifies
5If indifferent workers were not to move, the vacancy distribution would become degenerate, see Shimer
(2005).
6A formal proof of this can be obtained upon request.
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notation considerably.
2.1 Derivation of the equilibrium
Let V̂ E (W ) be the asset value of holding a job paying a wage W and let V̂ (W ) be the
number of vacancies that pay a wage equal to or higher than W . The asset value V̂ E (W )
satisfies the following Bellman equation:
ρV̂ E (W ) = W + δ
[
V U − V̂ E (W )
]
+ ψλ
∫ ∞
W
[
V̂ E (Z)− V̂ E (W )
]
dV̂ (Z)
Vˆ EW (W ) =
[
ρ+ δ + ψλV̂ (W )
]−1
where V U is the asset value of unemployment. Throughout the paper, subscripts of
functions denote the relevant (partial) derivative. A sufficient condition for equilibrium
is that the wage W (x) paid to an s-type worker employed in a job of type c = s ± x
maximizes the following product:7
W (x) ∈ argmax
W
[
V̂ E (W )− V U
]β [ Y (x)−W
ρ+ δ + ψλV̂ (W )
]1−β
The first factor in square brackets is the increase in wealth for the worker relative to the
status of unemployment, the second factor is the increase in wealth for the firm. The latter
is the current income stream Y (x)−W divided by a modified discount rate, accounting
for the interest rate ρ, the separation rate δ, and the quit rate of the worker to better paid
jobs, ψλV̂ (W ). By paying higher wages, firms and workers reduce the probability that
the worker quits to a better paying job. This increases the Nash product in the present
job. Hence, firms pay a no-quit premium which raises the wage above the simple sharing
rule that applies in models without on-the-job search, see also Shimer (2005).
The wage offer distribution, V̂ (·), can have no mass point in W . If V̂ (·) would have
a mass point at W ∗, then the surplus product would jump upward by a slight increase
in W above W ∗, since all vacancies at the mass points would no longer be able to poach
a worker from the job paying this slightly higher wage. This contradicts W ∗ being a
maximum of the surplus product. Since the surplus product is continuous in W and since
7Since at this stage we cannot rule out that the set of feasible pay offs is non-convex we cannot use
the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution. Our solution is consistent with Shimer’s alternating offer game
where we interpret the β′s either as different discount factors or as probabilities to make an offer.
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both Y (x) −W (x) and V̂ E [W (x)] − V U are positive (otherwise, either the firm or the
worker would not be willing to match), W (x) satisfies the following first order condition:
β [Y (x)−W (x)] = (1− β)
[
V̂ E [W (x)]− V U
]
×[
ρ+ δ + ψλV̂ [W (x)] + ψλV̂W [W (x)] [Y (x)−W (x)]
]
This condition states that the gain from a marginal wage increase for the worker is equal
to the cost of that increase for the firm, where both are weighted by their respective
bargaining power β and 1 − β. Since Y (x) is decreasing in the distance x, W (x) is
decreasing in x. Hence, we can define the number of vacancies and the asset value of a
job as functions of x instead of W :
V (x) ≡ V̂ [W (x)]
V E (x) ≡ V̂ E [W (x)]
V (x) is now the number of vacancies located at a shorter distance to worker type s than x.
These vacancies therefore offer a higher wage than W (x). Since vacancies are distributed
uniformly over the circumference, V (x) does not depend on s. Similarly, V E (x) is the
asset value of holding a job at distance x from the optimal type c = s. By the chain rule,
we get:
2v ≡ V̂W [W (x)]Wx (x)
V Ex (x) ≡ V̂ EW [W (x)]Wx (x)
In the first equation we use the uniform distribution of vacancies: the density of vacancies
of type c is v. The factor 2 comes in because increasing x adds a vacancy both to the
left and to the right of the optimal type c = s. Substitution of these expressions and the
expression for Y (x) in the first order condition and rearranging terms yields:
Wx (x) =
2 (1− β)ψλv [1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)] [V E(x)− V U]
β
[
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)]− (1− β) [V E (x)− V U ] (ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx) . (1)
The asset value for an unemployed job seeker satisfies the Bellman equation:
ρV U = B + 2λv
∫ x
0
[
V E (x)− V U] dx (2)
where x is the maximum distance of a job offer that is acceptable for an unemployed job
seeker. For interpretation, x is also the probability that a job offer is acceptable for an
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unemployed worker. Similarly, the asset value for an s-type worker holding a job of type
c = s± x satisfies the Bellman equation:
ρV E(x) = W (x) + 2ψλv
∫ x
0
[
V E (z)− V E (x)] dz − δ [V E (x)− V U] (3)
The disadvantage of writing the asset value this way is that it yields an implicit equation
in V E (x). In Appendix A.1 we show that the asset value can also be written in explicit
form:
V E(x) =
W (x)
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx
+
δ
ρ+ δ
V U + 2ψλv
∫ x
0
W (z)
(ρ+ δ + 2ψλvz)2
dz (4)
where the first term is the discounted wage income at the current job. The discount factor
consists of a time preference term, ρ, and two terms that take into account the rate at
which a match ends. This happens either by exogenous shocks, δ, or if the worker finds a
better job 2ψλvx. The number of better job types is given by 2vx (the worker can accept
jobs both to the left and to the right of her favorite job type) and the rate at which the
worker meets those jobs is ψλ. The second term is the probability to move to the state
of unemployment times the properly discounted value of this state and the final term is
the probability to find a better job times the discounted expected wage at this better job.
For the latter discount factor we have to take into account that both the transition rate
and the new state are discounted at rate (ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx)−1. Substitution of this explicit
expression for V E (x) in the wage equation yields:
Wx (x) =
(1− β)ψκv [1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)]R
β
[
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)]− (1− β) (1 + ψκvx)R (5)
where R ≡ W (x)
1 + ψκvx
− ρV U + ψκv
∫ x
0
W (z)
(1 + ψκvz)2
dz
κ ≡ 2λ
ρ+ δ
This is a differential equation in x. Its solution requires an initial condition. At the
marginal job, x = x, the surplus from matching is zero and hence neither the worker nor
the firm gains from matching. Hence,
W (x) = Y (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2 (6)
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Substitution of equation (4) in equation (2), and some rearrangement of terms yields:
ρV U =
B
1 + κvx
+
κv
1 + κvx
× (7)∫ x
0
[
W (x)
1 + ψκvx
+ ψκv
∫ x
0
W (z)
(1 + ψκvz)2
dz
]
dx
Finally, since ρV E (x) = ρV U , (4) implies:
0 =
W (x)
1 + ψκvx
− ρV U + ψκv
∫ x
0
W (x)
(1 + ψκvx)2
dx (8)
Note that all these relations depend on the composite parameter κ, not on its separate
components, ρ, δ, and λ.
Let E(x) be the number of individuals of type s that are employed in jobs that are
located at greater distances from s than x, and that are therefore less attractive than a
job at distance x. Hence, E (0) is total employment of type s, and E (x) = 0, since there
is no employment located at a distance greater than x. Since the density of labor supply
is normalized to unity, the rate of unemployment satisfies:
u = 1− E (0)
The equilibrium flow condition for employed workers at distance x or less from their
favorite job is:
2λvx [u+ ψE (x)] = (ρ+ δ) [E (0)− E (x)]
The left-hand side is the number of people that find such a job, partly from unemployment
(the first term in square brackets), partly by mobility from a less attractive job (the second
term). The latter number is downweighted by the factor ψ, reflecting the effectiveness of
on-the-job search. The right-hand side is the number of people that lose such a job and
the growth of the number of people that hold such a job due to the growth of the labor
force as a whole: the number of jobs at distance smaller than x, E (0)−E (x), times the
separation rate δ plus the growth rate ρ. Mobility within the segment E (x) of jobs that
are at smaller distance than x is irrelevant for this purpose, because the disappearance of
the old job and the emergence of the new job cancel. Setting x = x yields the equilibrium
flow condition for unemployment:
2λvux = (ρ+ δ)E (0)
11
Substitution in the labor supply equation yields an expression for the rate of unemploy-
ment:
u =
1
1 + κvx
(9)
and employment at distances greater than x:
E (x) =
1
1 + ψκvx
(
1− 1 + κvx
1 + κvx
)
(10)
By the free entry condition for firms, the option value of a vacancy of type c must be
equal to K. Hence:
K = 2λ
∫ x
0
[u+ ψE (x)]
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
ρ+ δ + ψλV (x)
dx
= κ
1 + ψκvx
1 + κvx
∫ x
0
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
(1 + ψκvx)2
dx (11)
The first factor in the integrand on the first line is the effective number of individuals
willing to accept a vacancy of type x. It equals the number of unemployed plus the number
of workers presently employed at greater distance than x. By the uniform distribution of
workers and jobs, the latter number is equal to the number of workers of type s employed
in jobs at a greater distance from s than x. The second factor is the value of a filled
vacancy. Just as in the wage equation, we discount current revenue Y (x)−W (x) by the
discount rate plus the separation rate δ plus the quit rate ψλV (x). The second line follows
from substitution of the relations for employment and unemployment. Note that again
these relations depend on the composite parameter κ, not on its separate components, ρ,
δ, and λ.
Definition 1 The equilibrium consists of the set {Wx (x) ,W (x) , ρV U , v, x} satisfying
(5) - (8) and (11). The unemployment rate u can be solved as a post-endogenous variable
from equation (9).
3 Characterization of the equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium for 3 cases. Section 3.1 briefly discusses the
case without on-the-job search, ψ = 0, 0 ≤ β < 1. This case serves as a benchmark.
Section 3.2 considers the monopsony model where on- and off-the-job search are equally
efficient, ψ = 1, β = 0. The case of equal efficiency has the advantage that the derivation
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of the reservation wage of an unemployed job seeker becomes trivial: it is simply equal to
the value of leisure, W (x) = B. Unemployed workers simply accept any job paying more
than B. Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the more general case 0 < ψ < 1, β = 0. We show
that the two previous models are just special cases of the more complex model presented
in Section 3.3. The general case 0 < ψ < 1, 0 < β < 1 is hard to analyze analytically,
since an explicit solution for the wage function W (x) is not available. We return to this
case in Section 4.2.
3.1 The case without on-the-job search: ψ = 0, 0 ≤ β < 1
In order to compare the results with the hierarchical model of Teulings and Gautier
(2004) we first solve the model for the case without on-the-job search, ψ = 0, 0 ≤ β < 1.
Equations (5) till (8) simplify considerably:
W (x) = β
[
1− 1
2
γx2
]
+ (1− β) ρV U (12)
ρV U = W (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2
K =
κ
1 + κvx
∫ x
0
[
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
]
dx
In the first equation we use the fact that Wx (x) 6= 0. Hence, since the numerator on
the right-hand side of equation (5) equals zero, this equation has a solution only if the
denominator is also equal to zero. Rearranging terms yields the first equation above.
This equation shows that wages are a simple weighted average of the worker’s outside
option, ρV U , and the productivity of the job, Y (x), so that workers receive a share β and
firms a share 1 − β of the match surplus. This simple linear sharing rule of the match
surplus holds only without on-the-job search because with on-the-job search, firms start
paying no-quit premiums, giving rise to the type of differential equations discussed in the
previous section. The second equation combines (6) - (8) and implies that the flow value
of unemployment, ρV U , is equal to the reservation wage of the unemployed,W (x). Again,
this equality holds only without on-the-job search. With on-the-job search, workers retain
a share ψ of the option value of search, so that accepting a job becomes less costly. This
raises the flow value of unemployment above the reservation wage. The asset value of
unemployment (7) reduces to:
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ρV U = B + βκv
∫ x
0
(
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
)
dx = B +
1
3
βγκvx3 (13)
This is a similar expression as the Taylor expansion in Teulings and Gautier (2004, Propo-
sition 2). However, in this model the relationship is exact and not an approximation.
Three additional assumptions made in this paper allow the exact calculation of V U . First,
we apply a circular instead of a hierarchical representation of heterogeneity. Second, the
skill distribution is uniform while it can take any form in Teulings and Gautier (2004).
Third, Y (x) is a quadratic function.
Proposition 2 For the case ψ = 0, β > 0 the equilibrium in u and x for the model is
characterized by the following equations:
3u+ 2β (1− u)
3u
x2 = B∗ (14)
B∗ ≡ 2 (1−B)
γ
2
√
6
u5/2 (1− β)
[3u+ 2 (1− u) β]3/2
= K∗ (15)
K∗ ≡
√
γK
κ (1−B)3/2
Proof: First, we substitute the (steady-state) relationship v = (1−u)/(uκx) into equation
(16) to obtain equation (14). Using ρV U =W (x) = 1− 1
2
γx2 and solving (13) for v yields:
v =
1− 1
2
γx2 −B
1
3
βγκx3
(16)
Substitution of (14) into equation (11) and rewriting results in equation (15).
Equations (14) and (15) form a system of equations that yield solutions for x and u.
Though the model has four structural parameters, K,B, γ, and κ (apart from the bar-
gaining power, β, and the relative efficiency of on-the-job search, ψ), the solution depends
on only two composite parameters, B∗ and K∗. This feature applies for all other equilibria
with different parameter values of β and ψ considered throughout the paper.
Proposition 3 For K∗ < 2
3
√
2 (1− β) there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive
supply of vacancies.
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Proof: The left-hand side of equation (15) is upward sloping and equal to zero when
u = 0. Substitution of u = 1 in equation (15) and using the mean value theorem yields
the critical value for K∗. For lower values of K∗, this equation has a single root.
For K∗ larger than the critical value, we obtain the trivial equilibrium where no vacancies
are opened and everybody is unemployed. All results we have obtained so far for the
circular model correspond exactly to those obtained for the hierarchical model of Teulings
and Gautier (2004). This raises hope that a similar equivalence applies for the model with
on-the-job search.
Our comparative statics results are summarized in Table 1. The details can be found in
Appendix A.2. Apart from two ambiguities, we derive general conclusions with respect to
the comparative statics. The exceptions are the first order derivatives of v with respect to
γ and κ. The ∩-sign implies that the first order derivative is positive for small levels of K∗
and negative for larger values and the ∪-sign implies the opposite situation. Essentially,
the sign of this derivative only depends on the level of the unemployment rate, which
has a positive relationship with K∗. For levels of u smaller than (−2β +√6β)/(3− 2β),
the relationship between v and κ is negative, while the relationship between v and γ is
positive. The turning point is the same for γ and κ. It is increasing in β, being equal to
0 for β = 0 and equal to −2 +√6 ≃ 0.45 for β = 1. In parenthesis, we give the expected
sign for realistic values of the unemployment rate. Even for very small levels of β (i.e. 10
percent) the unemployment rate should be over 20% to falsify these expected signs of v
and κ and v and γ, which is an irrelevant range for most western economies.
Table 1: Comparative statics of the model for β > 0 and ψ = 0. A +-sign indicates that
the first order derivative is positive
u x v
γ + − ∩ (+)
κ − − ∪ (−)
B + − −
K + + −
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3.2 Monopsony with on- and off-the-job search equally efficient:
ψ = 1, β = 0
With on-the-job search, the equilibrium characterization becomes considerably more com-
plicated. One useful simplification is the case where on- and off-the-job-search are equally
efficient. In that case unemployed workers do not give up any option value of continued
search so their reservation wage simply becomes equal to B. The following Proposition
characterizes the equilibrium for this case.
Proposition 4 For the case ψ = 1, β = 0, wages are given by:
W (x) = 1− γx− x
κv
− 1
2
γx (2x− x)− γ 1 + κvx
κ2v2
log
(
1 + κvx
1 + κvx
)
(17)
and the equilibrium in u and x for the model is characterized by the following equations:
x2 = B∗
f(u) = K∗ (18)
where f(u) is defined as:
f (u) ≡ −2
√
2
(
u
1− u
)2(
log u
1 + 1
2
u log u
1− u + 1
)
(19)
Proof: Equation (17) is a trivial application of the proof of Proposition 6 to be discussed
in Section 3.3. Equation (19) can be obtained by solving the integral in equation (11)
and using the steady-state relationship (9).
The wage equation (17) is dramatically different from (12) for the case without on-the-job
search. In the latter case, a simple linear sharing rule applies where wages are a weighted
average of the outside option of the firm and the reservation wage of the worker. Then,
the flatness of productivity in the optimal assignment implies the flatness of the wage
function at that point: Wx (0) = Yx (0) = 0. This characteristic does not carry over to the
equilibrium with on-the-job search. The situation is sketched in Figure 1. We drawW (x)
both for ψ = 0 (no on-the-job search) and ψ = 1. The locus of value added Y (x) does
not depend on ψ. On-the-job search lowers the reservation wage W (x), since employed
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Figure 1: The wages paid by firms as a function of the levels of x. The parameters used
are γ = 12, B = 0.2, K = 0.1, κ = 10 and ψ = 1, β = 0 for the case with on-the-job search
while ψ = 0, β = 0.5 for the case without on-the-job search.
workers retain part of the option value of search so that accepting a job is less costly
and matching sets become larger. Firms pay ”no-quit” premiums to avoid workers being
poached by other firms. The premium of one firm induces other firms to pay even higher
premiums in equilibrium. As a consequence, the wage locus is non-differentiable at the
optimal assignment x = 0, leading to a peak in the locus. Since all firms pay ”no-quit”
premiums, they have no net effect on actual quit behavior. So even though firms compete
for workers by paying ”no-quit” premiums, the actual mobility pattern is unaffected by
these premiums: workers keep on moving towards the optimal assignment, x = 0. Any
vacancy type with a lower x than the present job will be accepted.
The remarkable consequence of this argument is that the instantaneous profit margin
for an employed worker, Y (x) − W (x), does not reach its maximum at the optimal
assignment, x = 0: while Yx (0) = 0, W
+
x (0) < 0 (and the reverse for the left derivative).
Hence, an ε deviation leads to a rise in the surplus. The effect of on-the-job search on
W (x) is undetermined. Since reservation wages are lower with on-the-job search, wages
for similar jobs can be either lower or higher: the no-quit premium pushes wages up, the
lower reservation wages pulls them down.
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Equation (19) for the unemployment rate can be directly compared to equation (15)
for the model without on-the-job search. The right-hand side of both equations is the
same. Surprisingly, the unemployment rate is determined by exactly the same structural
parameters in both models, and these parameters carry the same relative weight. However,
the sensitivity of the unemployment rate with respect to changes in these parameters
differs, in the following order:
1. monopsony without on-the-job search, ψ = 0, β = 0
2. monopsony with on-the-job search, ψ = 1, β = 0
3. Nash bargaining without on-the-job search, ψ = 0, 0 < β < 1.
With on-the-job search, the direct effect of an increase in κ on unemployment is
partially offset by the stronger competition between firms for workers. This pushes up the
”no-quit” premium, reducing ex post profits and hence decreases the supply of vacancies.
Without on-the-job search and positive β, workers become choosier as κ increases which
also dampens the decrease in unemployment.
Proposition 5 For K∗ < 2
3
√
2 there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive supply of
vacancies.
Proof: The equilibrium condition is of the form f(u) = constant where u is bounded
between 0 and 1, with f (0) = 0 and limu→1 f(u) =
2
3
√
2. Figure 2 shows that f (u)
is monotonically increasing so a unique interior equilibrium exists for sufficiently low
K∗(K∗ < limu→1 f(u)). 
The comparative statics of the model are the same as when β > 0 and ψ = 0 as represented
in Table 1. We refer to Appendix A.3 for details. The only difference is that x does not
change with κ and K. Again, the sign of the first order derivatives of v with respect to
κ and γ are determined by the level of the unemployment rate. For low levels of u, the
first order derivative with respect to κ is negative while it is positive for γ. For larger
values of u, we find opposite signs. Again the turning point is at the same value for u for
both γ and κ: u = 27%. This level corresponds well with the levels found in the previous
subsection.
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Figure 2: The first derivative of f(u).
3.3 Monopsony with on-the-job search less efficient: 0 < ψ <
1, β = 0
The case where 0 < ψ < 1 complicates the analysis since the reservation wage is no longer
equal to the value of leisure because workers have to give up part of the option value of
search when accepting a job. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For the case 0 < ψ < 1, β = 0, wages are given by:
W (x) = 1 + γ
x− x
ψκv
+
1
2
γx (x− 2x)− γ 1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2
log
(
1 + ψκvx
1 + ψκvx
)
(20)
Define:
z(u, ψ) ≡ ψ1− u
u
Then, equilibrium values of z and x are the solution to the system of equations:
x2
[
1
ψ
+
1− ψ
ψz
log (1 + z)
[
1
z
log (1 + z)− 2
]]
= B∗ (21)
Q (z, ψ) = K∗
where:
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Q (z, ψ) ≡ 2
√
2ψ5/2
(1 + z)
{
log(1 + z)
[
1 + z − 1
2
log(1 + z)
]− z}
(ψ + z) {z2 + (1− ψ) log (1 + z) [log (1 + z)− 2z]}3/2
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
The proposition characterizes the equilibrium as a system of two implicit equations in x
and z. Since z is a continuous and monotonically declining function of u with z (1, ψ) = 0
and z (0, ψ) = ∞, any positive value of z implies a unique value of u. It turns out that
this transformation is convenient in all cases where on-the-job search is less efficient then
off-the-job search, 0 < ψ < 1. Hence, it will be applied throughout the paper. The first
relation reflects labor supply: the more jobs are opened, the lower the unemployment
rate u (the higher z), the stronger the bargaining position of workers, the more choosy
they are and therefore the lower is x. The second relation reflects labor demand. The
right-hand side of the second line of equation (21) is the same as the previous equations
for unemployment (15), and (19). Proposition 7 states that the right-hand side converges
to the special cases ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 discussed in the previous sections:
Proposition 7 The limits of Q(ψ 1−u
u
, ψ) with respect to ψ are equal to:
lim
ψ→0
Q
(
ψ
1− u
u
, ψ
)
= 2
√
2
u
3
lim
ψ→1
Q
(
ψ
1− u
u
, ψ
)
= −2
√
2
u2
(1− u)2
(
log u
1 + 1
2
u log u
1− u + 1
)
These limits satisfy equation (15) and (19) respectively.
Proof: See appendix A.5.
The next proposition shows uniqueness and provides conditions for existence of the equi-
librium.
Proposition 8 For K∗ < 2
3
√
2/
√
ψ there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive
supply of vacancies.
Proof: See Appendix A.6.
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We show in the appendix that Qz < 0 for any level of 0 < ψ < 1. This implies that
dQ(ψ 1−u
u
, ψ) > 0 and hence unemployment increases with γ, K and B and it deceases
with κ. The other comparative statics, as derived in the previous sections, are very hard
to derive for the present case. Proposition 7 in combination with the results derived in the
previous sections suggest that the results should be qualitatively the same. This implies
that the signs of the derivatives of v and x remain the same.
4 Welfare and the cost of search
In a world with search frictions, output is lower than it would be in a Walrasian world
without search frictions. This section analyses the magnitude of the cost of search, defined
as the relative loss in output compared to the frictionless equilibrium. We show that
minimizing the cost of search is equivalent to maximizing the asset value of unemployment,
V U .
There are two reasons why search frictions reduce output. First, the constraints im-
posed by the search technology cause unemployment mismatch and costly vacancy cre-
ation. This loss can only be reduced by a more efficient search technology. Second, output
is lost due to inefficient decentralized decision making given the constraints of the search
technology. Below, we decompose the cost of search in these two parts and suggest insti-
tutional remedies to reduce the second part, like changing workers’ bargaining power β
or introducing unemployment insurance, so that agents’ decisions are better aligned. An-
other way to decompose the cost of search is by its three technical components: foregone
production due to unemployment, the cost of maintaining vacancies, and the productiv-
ity loss due to suboptimal assignment. This decomposition is particularly important for
empirical inference on the cost of search. Whether or not one allows for on-the-job search
matters a lot for this exercise.
4.1 The cost of search and the asset value of unemployment
In a frictionless economy, all workers are assigned to their optimal job where they produce
Y (0) = 1. Since labor supply is normalized to one, this is equal to total output. We define
the cost of search X as the loss in current output relative to this first best outcome. Since
the first best outcome is normalized to one, the absolute cost is equal to the relative cost.
Hence, we focus on the absolute cost. This cost is equal to the sum of its three technical
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components, unemployment, vacancies, and suboptimal assignment:
X ≡ 1−
∫ x
0
Y (x)Ex (x) dx− uB + vK (22)
where Ex(x) is the absolute value of the first order derivative of E(x). This function is the
density function of workers that work at distance x from their optimal assignment. The
first term is first best output, while the second term is actual output. The difference is
the cost of suboptimal assignment plus the output loss due to unemployment. However,
unemployed job seekers do enjoy leisure, which is captured by the third term. The fourth
term is the cost of keeping vacancies open. Using (10) we can derive:
Ex(x) =
κv
(1 + ψκvx)2
1 + ψκvx
1 + κvx
(23)
Substitution of this equation together with equation (9) yields an expression for X as a
function of the acceptance rule x and unemployment u, or alternatively using z as defined
in the previous section:
X (x, u) = −γx2 z + ψ − 1
z2 (z + ψ)
[(
1 +
1
z
)
log (1 + z)−
(
1 +
1
2
z
)]
(24)
+
1
z + ψ
(1−B) + z
ψx
K
κ
where we omit the arguments of z (u, ψ) for the sake of convenience. Note that this
expression depends only on technical constraints, not on decision rules. Hence, a social
planner can never do better than maximizing this expression. The subsequent proposition
relates this expression for the cost of search to the asset value of unemployment in the
decentralized equilibrium.
Proposition 9 If x and u satisfy the decentralized equilibrium of Proposition 6, then:
X (x, u) = 1− ρV U
Proof: See Appendix A.7. 
In other words, if we restrict ourselves to the market outcome, then maximizing the asset
value of unemployment is equivalent to minimizing the cost of search. This conclusion
deviates from the standard result in search models where unemployment carries a greater
weight in the asset value of the unemployed than in current output, since the unemployed
22
have to pay the full cost of current unemployment while the future revenues of employment
must be discounted. The reason that this problem does not show up here is the golden
growth assumption, which sets the worker’s discount rate equal to the growth rate of
the labor force. Current output is the result of earlier search effort of older and smaller
generations of job seekers. Hence current output is less than the output that is to be
expected from current search effort. In this way, the composition of current output exactly
accounts for the discounting of future output by today’s job seekers. This feature simplifies
our welfare analysis considerably. We can just maximize the asset value of unemployment
V U or minimize the cost of search X (x, u) in the steady state here. This is what we do
in the subsequent analysis.
4.2 Welfare analysis
Given the constraints imposed on X by the search technology, the market outcome de-
pends on three types of decisions: (1) the number of vacancies v opened by firms, (2)
the job acceptance rule x applied by unemployed job seekers, and (3) the job acceptance
rule applied by employed workers. The latter decision rule is simple: employed workers
accept any job offer that is at shorter distance from the optimal assignment than their
present job. This decision rule is clearly efficient, since there is no option value lost by
switching to a more productive job, neither for the worker, nor for the firm. Since this
rule is efficient, a social planner will not change it. This leaves the social planner with
two decision variables, x and v. Since equation (9) provides the steady-state relation
conditional on the degree of search frictions between v on the one hand and x and u on
the other hand, we can just as well use the latter two as the relevant decision variables.
The social planner’s first best optimum minimizes X (x, u) with respect to x and u.8 For
the general case this expression is hard to evaluate. However, for the special case that
on- and off-the-job search are equally efficient, ψ = 1, we can again benefit from the fact
that accepting a job yields no loss in the option of obtaining an even better job, so that
x =
√
B∗. Substitution of these expressions in equation (24) yields:
X
(√
B∗, u
)
=
√
2 (1−B)
(√
2
u
1− u
[
u
1− u log (u) + 1
]
+
1− u
u
K∗
)
(25)
Minimizing this expression with respect to u yields an implicit equation for the first best
level of unemployment, u∗:
8The advantage of this is that u is bounded between 0 and 1 while v is not.
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Figure 3: The decentralized market and the efficient unemployment rate.
2
√
2
(
u∗
1− u∗
)2(
2
u∗
1− u∗ log u
∗ + 1 + u∗
)
= K∗ (26)
Note that the right-hand side of this expression is equal to the right-hand side of the
market equilibrium in Proposition 4. Hence, we are able to compare the unemployment
rate of the social planner with the rate achieved in a decentralized economy with β = 0
and ψ = 0 just by comparing the left-hand side expressions. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
The upper curve is the decentralized equilibrium in equation (19), the lower curve is the
unemployment rate preferred by the social planner in equation (26), both as a function
of the expression on the left-hand side. We come to the following conclusion.
Corollary 10 Unemployment is too low in the decentralized equilibrium, implying that
the number of vacancies is too high.
Taking a natural rate of 5% as benchmark, unemployment should be about 25% higher
than it is in the decentralized equilibrium with β = 0.
Why is unemployment too low in the decentralized equilibrium? As a benchmark for
the subsequent discussion it is useful to briefly discuss the conclusion of Teulings and
Gautier (2004) for the case with Nash bargaining and no on-the-job search, ψ = 0, 0 <
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β < 1. In that case, workers accept too many job offers. Since there is no on-the-job
search, unemployed job seekers lose their full option value of search when accepting a
job. Hence, their reservation wage is equal to the flow value of unemployment, which
is the sum of the value of leisure and the option value of search. Alternatively, this
can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the bargaining outcome is on the
Pareto frontier and leaves no gains from unexploited trade. Hence, if the flow value of
unemployment is first best, the acceptance rule is also first best. If not, job seekers and
firms match too easily, so x is above first best. The quadratic contact technology implies
the absence of negative congestion externalities both at the firm and the worker side of
the market, only thick market externalities are relevant. Therefore, both the firm and the
employer should get the full surplus of the match, which is obviously infeasible. Hence,
firms create too few vacancies, the value of unemployment is below first best and matches
are formed too easily. The only way to restore efficiency in a decentralized equilibrium
is an unemployment insurance that pays workers the first best value of unemployment
in combination with giving firms full bargaining power, β → 0, so that they are able to
capture the full match surplus. In the absence of unemployment insurance, β = 1/2 is
the second best outcome. If β → 0 without unemployment insurance, then firms capture
the full match surplus. Due to free entry, firms invest that entire surplus in the creation
of new vacancies, such that workers end up with just the value of leisure.
With on- and off-the-job search being equally efficient, ψ = 1, unemployed job seekers
do not lose any option value by accepting a job. Hence, they are prepared to accept any job
that pays more than the value of leisure, B. This is also the efficient outcome, since there
is no option value of search at stake. As before, there are no congestion effects, ruling out
negative search externalities. However, the split of the match surplus is entirely different
from the model without on-the-job search and 0 < β < 1, for three reasons. First, we
assume monopsonistic wage formation, β = 0, which gives firms a large share of the
surplus. Second, the acceptance rule x is less strict with than without on-the-job search
(since with on-the-job search there is no option value lost). This reduces the reservation
wage and shifts surplus to the firm. Third, on-the-job search introduces competition
between firms for workers, which pushes up wages. This reduces the firm’s share in the
surplus. We provided a graphical illustration of these differences in Figure 1. These three
forces simultaneously make the share of the surplus for the firms too large. They create
more vacancies than is efficient. The intuition behind the inefficiency is that there is a
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poaching externality. A firm that opens a vacancy does not adequately internalize the
output loss it imposes on another firm when it poaches a worker. Though the job move
itself is efficient, its welfare gain is too small to justify the cost of opening a vacancy.
Note that this externality is different from the standard poaching externality which is
driven by investments in human capital, i.e. Moen and Rosen (2004). Poaching can
reduce investments in human capital because parts of the returns to those investments
go to future employers. In our model we have no investments in human capital but
the equilibrium is still not efficient. Our finding is related to the ”business-stealing”
externality in for example Salop (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In these models
economics of scale are not optimally exploited. In our setting, the expected private benefits
of opening a vacancy are higher than the social benefits. Note that this result is based on
the assumption that firms have all the bargaining power. Proposition 11 shows that the
”business-stealing” externality need no longer exist whenever we change the bargaining
power.
Proposition 11 For ψ = 1, there exists a unique value of β ∈ (0, 1) for which the
decentralized unemployment rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum.
Proof: We already showed that unemployment is too low for β = 0. For β = 1, workers
receive the full match surplus. This drives the number of vacancies to zero and unem-
ployment to unity, which is obviously too high. Now consider the zero profit condition
for ψ = 1:
K = κ
∫ x
0
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
(1 + κvx)2
dx
Since x does not depend on β for ψ = 1 and since W (x) is determined by (5), which
is continuous in β, vacancy supply is continuous in β. By the continuity of vacancy
supply in β, there must be an intermediate value for β for which the unemployment
rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum. Uniqueness is a direct result of Wx(x)
being a decreasing function of β, see (5), and together with (6), this implies that for any
x < x, ∂W (x)/∂β > 0. Hence, vacancy supply decreases with β.
The optimal value of β can be calculated in the following way. First, we calculate the
desired number of vacancies in the Planner’s equilibrium. Then, we numerically determine
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Figure 5: The optimal level of β for different values of K∗.
27
the level of β that yields this desired number of vacancies, where we use (1) and (11). We
let K∗ run from 0 to 0.9. Figure 4 shows the actual and optimal vacancy stock. Both
increase with K∗ initially and start to decrease when K∗ becomes larger. This effect
was already described in subsection 3.2, but as we show here also applies for the social
planner.9 The turning point of the social planner lies to the right from the turning point
of the market. Figure 5 shows that the level of β needed to offset the ”business-stealing”
externality is quite large. The lower K∗, the higher the required value of β, since most
workers are already close to the optimal assignment, and hence the ”business-stealing”
externality is large. The optimal level of β can be even larger than 0.5, which is the
optimal level for the case without on-the-job search, 0 < β < 1, ψ = 0.
A formal welfare analysis for the intermediate case, 0 < ψ < 1, is complicated. How-
ever, given the continuity of the equilibrium in ψ and β, the conclusion from this analysis
is obvious. For small ψ (little on-the-job search), there is too little search and unem-
ployment and the number of vacancies is too low. Raising β does not offer a solution,
since there is simply too little surplus to reward both job seekers and firms according to
their marginal contribution to the search process, unless one can combine unemployment
insurance and a large bargaining power for the firm. Without unemployment insurance,
β should be typically about a half. For high ψ (on-the-job search highly effective), first
best can be attained. That requires that β > 0. Even for ψ = 1, the optimal value of β
is again close to one half for reasonable values of K∗.
The previous analysis has shown that raising β above zero raises efficiency by reducing
the incentives to create vacancies. However, if the social planner has no instrument to
change workers’ bargaining power, the introduction of unemployment insurance can be
an alternative. From the outset we can see that this instrument can never implement first
best because it distorts the job acceptance decision by a moral hazard problem: workers
reject all jobs that pay less than the value of leisure plus the unemployment benefit, while
the efficient rule would be to reject only jobs that pay less than the value of leisure.
Since we consider the decentralized equilibrium, equation (25) applies. For the sake of
simplicity, we concentrate on the case that the value of leisure is equal to zero, so that we
can interpret B as an unemployment benefit. In that case, a term uB should be added to
the cost of search, so that we minimize X+ (u) ≡ X
(√
B∗, u
)
+ uB subject to equation
(18).
9A formal proof of this is similar to the one described earlier in the paper.
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Proposition 12 The optimal level of UI benefits for the case ψ = 1, β = 0 is positive,
B > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.8.
We are not the first to argue that even under risk neutrality there is a welfare improving
role for UI benefits. Burdett (1979), Diamond (1981), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and
Teulings and Gautier (2004) all argue that UI benefits can serve as a search subsidy
that prevents workers to stop searching too soon. Here we give a different argument,
namely that unemployment insurance reduces the business-stealing externality that leads
to excess vacancy supply by raising the reservation wage of the worker.
4.3 The cost of search by its three components
The cost of search X can also be decomposed by its three technical components, unem-
ployment, the cost of vacancies, and the productivity loss due to a suboptimal assignment.
Such a decomposition is useful for empirical inference on the empirical magnitude of search
frictions. For example, Teulings and Gautier (2004) provided an approximate decompo-
sition of the cost of search for the case of Nash bargaining and without on-the-job search,
ψ = 0, 0 < β < 1, that applies for small values of X:
X ∼= 3
2
(1−B)u
β
∼= 3
2
v
(1− β)K
∼= 3E [1− Y (x) |x ≤ x]
where we use Y (0) = 1. This decomposition allows one to estimate the cost of search
from unemployment data. E.g., if the value of leisure B = 0, the bargaining power
of workers β = 1
2
, then the cost of search X is three times the unemployment rate
u. A natural unemployment rate of about 5% implies the cost of search to be 15%.
However, there is an alternative way to estimate X, namely by the average wage loss
among employed workers relative to their wage in the optimal assignment. Since workers
receive a share β of the value of output above the output in the marginal acceptable job
type, W (x) −W (x) = β [Y (x)− Y (x)], the mean wage loss compared to the wage in
the optimal assignment is:
E [W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x] = 1
3
βX (27)
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This equality follows directly from the wage setting relationship: W (0) − W (x) =
β [1− Y (x)]. Gautier and Teulings (2004) use standard human capital variables and occu-
pation and industry dummies to obtain an estimate of the mismatch indicator x. Applying
this indicator in a wage regression yields an estimate of E[W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x] ∼= 5% .
Setting β = 1
2
, this method yields a higher value of the cost of search, X ∼= 25%, than
the estimate of X derived from the unemployment rate. These conflicting estimates can
be viewed as a rejection of the model without on-the-job search by the data.
On-the-job search offers a solution for this contradiction. For the case with on-the-job
search and monopsonistic wage setting, 0 < ψ ≤ 1, β = 0, the following expressions for
the expected wage loss compared to the wage in the first best assignment and the cost of
search can be derived, see Appendix A.9:
E [W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x] = (1−B) ψ
z
2 (2 + z) z log (1 + z)− 3z2 − (1 + z) log2 (1 + z)
z2 + (1− ψ) log (1 + z) [log (1 + z)− 2z]
(28)
X = (1−B)ψ log (1 + z) [2z − log (1 + z)]
z2 + (1− ψ) log (1 + z) [log (1 + z)− 2z]
For these equations, we are able to derive the following approximations for small unem-
ployment levels
lim
u→0
−E [W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x]
(1−B)u [2 log(u) + 3] = 1
lim
u→0
− X
2(1−B)u log(u) = 1
Note that the second term in parentheses of the denominator of the first line is of higher
order. Hence, this term can be dropped without changing the order of the approximation.
However, as we show in Figures 6 and 7, the extra term makes an important improvement
in the speed of convergence. Remarkably, according to those approximations, the relation
between the cost of search and the mean wage loss relative to the wage in the optimal
assignment on the one hand and the unemployment rate on the other hand do not depend
on ψ. Second, the mean wage loss is larger than the cost of search. For an unemployment
rate of 5%, the first is about 30% while the second is 15% .
Table 2 summarizes our findings for the models with and without on-the-job search.
We conclude the following. First, estimates of the cost of search from the mean wage
30
00.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
X
,W
u
E [W (0) −W (x) |x ≤ x]
− (1−B) u [2 log u ⋆ 3]
· ·
· ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
· · ··
X
−2 (1−B) u logu
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆
Figure 6: E[W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x] and X and their approximations evaluated at various
levels of u for ψ = 1/2.
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Figure 7: E[W (0)−W (x) |x ≤ x] and X and their approximations evaluated at various
levels of u for ψ = 1.
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loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment are more robust than estimates
from the unemployment rates because the latter require a stance on the value of B, while
the former does not. Second, the ratio of the mean wage loss compared to the wage in
the optimal assignment and the unemployment rate is higher in a world with on-the-job
search. The difference can be as high as a factor 6 when the unemployment rate equals
5 percent. Finally, note that these relations hold only approximately. This can be seen
immediately, by letting β → 0 in the first column and by letting ψ → 0 in the second
column (which is irrelevant, since ψ does not enter the relevant expressions). These limits
are not equal even though they approximate the same situation.10
Table 2: Representation of the differences in the cost of search for the off- and on-the-job
search model.
0 < β < 1, ψ = 0 β = 0, 0 < ψ < 1 (∼= refers to u = 0.05)
X
E[W (0)−W (x)|x≤x]
3
β
2 log u
2 log u+3
∼= 2
X
u
3
2β
(1−B) −2 log u (1−B) ∼= 6 (1−B)
u
E[W (0)−W (x)|x≤x]
2 1
1−B
− 1
2 log u+3
1
1−B
∼= 13 11−B
One important conclusion to draw from this Table is that if one wants to estimate X
from u, then allowing for on-the-job-search gives substantially larger estimates, especially
when u is low. Therefore, on-the-job-search can - compared to the situation without on-
the-job search - bridge the gap between the independent estimates of X based on wage
and unemployment data.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we characterize the equilibrium of a model with a continuum of job and
worker types, search frictions, transferable utility and free entry, allowing for on-the-job
search. On-the-job search has implications for (i) wage bargaining, (ii) entry of vacancies,
and (iii) the value of unemployment relative to employment. We derived the total output
losses due to the existence of search frictions and show that those losses are equal to
10The reason is that for both columns the limits are degenerate. This can be seen as follows, for
column 1, compare equation (15); for column 2, taking a limit to an ever increasing efficiency of the
search process (which is what we do when considering u → 0 for the approximate relations in Table 1)
implies that on-the-job search will dominate off-the-job search in the end; only by setting ψ = 0, this
mechanism breaks down.
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the difference between the reservation wage in the optimal assignment and the actual
reservation wage. Teulings and Gautier (2004) derived in a model without on-the-job
search that for equal bargaining power and no on-the-job search, this cost of search is
about three times the unemployment rate which is lower than direct estimates suggest.
Here, we show that although on-the-job search reduces the total welfare loss due to search
frictions it increases the difference between the lowest and the highest possible wage for
a given skill type. So allowing for on-the-job-search bridges the gap between the two
independent methods to calculate the cost of search. In addition, we show that the number
of vacancies is higher and the unemployment rate is lower than in the social optimum.
This is due to a business-stealing externality: in a market with on-the-job search an
individual firm does not fully internalize that opening a vacancy reduces expected job
durations at other matches. For reasonable parameter values this externality turns out
to be substantial. Positive unemployment benefits can improve efficiency.
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Appendix
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Derivation of equation (4)
Taking total derivatives from equation (3) yields:
V Ex (x) =
Wx(x)
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx
The solution to this differential equation reads:
V E(x) =
x∫
0
Wx(z)
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvz
dz + C0
=
W (x)
ρ+ δ + 2ψλvx
− W (0)
ρ+ δ
+ 2λvψ
x∫
0
W (z)
(ρ+ δ + 2ψλvz)2
dz + C0
Substitution of x = 0 yields:
C0 = V
E(0) =
W (0)
ρ+ δ
+
δ
ρ+ δ
V U
Substitution of this into the solution of the differential equation yields the desired expression.
A.2 Comparative statics results for the case β > 0, ψ = 0
Since the left-hand side of (15) is monotonically increasing in u, the comparative statics con-
clusions follow straightforwardly. Substitution of (16) in (11) and some rearrangement of terms
yields [
1−B −
(
1
2
− 1
3
β
)
γx2
]
K − 1
9
(1− β) βγ2κx5 = 0 (29)
The relationship between x and the exogenous parameters of the model can be derived by total
differentiation of this equation. Total differentiation of equation (15). Taking total derivatives,
substitution of equation (14) and (15) and rearranging terms yields:
dv
dκ
=
1
κ2
√
γ
6 (1−B)
√
3u+ 2β (1− u)
u (3− 2β) + 5β
3u2 − 2 (1− u)2 β
u
√
u
The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of 3u2 − 2 (1− u)2 β. Because of the positive
relationship betweenK∗ and u discussed above, this implies that for low levels ofK∗ an increase
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in this parameter induces a decrease in the number of vacancies whereas such an increase has a
positive impact on vacancies when K∗ is high. Using the same techniques, we can derive that
the first order derivative of v with respect to γ equals:
dv
dγ
= − κ
2γ
dv
dκ
Hence, both derivatives have opposite sign.
A.3 Comparative statics results for the case β = 0, ψ = 1
Consider second line of the equilibrium condition (18). We have: x =
√
B∗. Total differentiation
of the second equation in the market equilibrium of Proposition 4 yields the partial derivatives
with respect to K and B. The derivative of v with respect to κ reads:
dv
dκ
=
log u (2u+ 1− u2 + u log u) + 2 (1− u)
κ2xu2f ′(u) (1− u)
The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of log u (2u+ 1− u2 + u log u) + 2 (1− u).
This function can be plotted for various values of u. It is negative for small values of u and
positive for larger values. The function has a single root at u = 27%. Hence, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between v and κ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
For β = 0, equation (5) simplifies to:
Wx (x) = −κψv
1− 1
2
γx2 −W (x)
1 + ψκvx
This can be rewritten as:
Wx (x) + p(x)W (x) = s(x)
p(x) ≡ − ψκv
1 + ψκx
s(x) ≡ −ψκv
(
1− 1
2
γx2
)
1 + ψκvx
The general form of the solution is (see for example Kreyszig, 1993:31):
W (x) = e−t(x)
[∫
et(x)s(x)dx+ c
]
t(x) ≡
∫
p(x)dx
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Hence,
W (x) = 1 +
1
2
γx2 − γ 1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2
log (1 + ψκvx)
+
γ
ψ2κ2v2
+ γ
x
ψκv
+ c (1 + ψκvx)
Solving c from the initial condition for W (x), equation (6) yields:
W (x) = 1 + γ
x− x
ψκv
+
1
2
γx (x− 2x)− γ 1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2
log
(
1 + ψκvx
1 + ψκvx
)
Substitution of this relation for wages in equation (8) and (11), solving the integrals, and sub-
stitution of κvx for (1− u) /u, see equation (9), proves the Proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Using the continuous mapping theorem, the limit for ψ → 0 can be rewritten as:
lim
ψ→0
Q (z, ψ) ≡ 2
√
2 lim
ψ→0
log(1 + z)
(
1 + z − 1
2
log(1 + z)
)− z
ψ3
× lim
ψ→0
(1 + z)ψ
ψ + z
×
[
lim
ψ→0
ψ3
z2 + (1− ψ) log (1 + z) [log (1 + z)− 2z]
]3/2
These limits can be calculated by substitution of z =ψ(1−u)/u and using l’Hopitals’ rule. The
result follows from substitution of these results into the total limit above.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Since z is a continuous and monotonic declining function of u with z (1, ψ) = 0and z (0, ψ) =
∞, any positive value of z implies a unique admissible value of u. We have:
lim
z→0
Q(z, ψ) =
2
3
√
2ψ−1/2
lim
z→∞
Q(z, ψ) = 0
Hence, a unique equilibrium exists if Q(z, ψ) is monotonically decreasing in z and:
K∗ <
2
3
√
2ψ−1/2
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Figure 8: Qz evaluated at various levels of u and ψ.
Hence, we have to show that Qz (z, ψ) < 0. Since
dz
du
< 0, this is equivalent to showing that
d
du
[
Q
(
ψ 1−u
u
, ψ
)]
> 0 for the relevant domain u × ψ = [0, 1] × [0, 1].We provide a plot in
Figure 8. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Substitution of equation (20) in equation (30) and solving the integrals yields:
ρV U = B +
γ
ψ
[
1
2
x2 +
1
2ψ2κ2v2
log2 (1 + κvψx)− x
ψκv
log (1 + ψκvx)
]
(30)
= B +
γx2
2ψ
[
1 +
1
z
log2 (1 + z)− 2
z
log (1 + z)
]
where we substitute v for equation (9) and z ≡ ψ 1−u
u
in the second line. Using the first line of
equation (21), we obtain:
1− ρV U = 1
2
γx2
1
z
log(1 + z)
[
2− 1
z
log(1 + z)
]
.For X we substitute the term Ex(x) using equation (23) into equation (22) to obtain:
X = 1−1 + ψκvx
1 + κvx
κv
∫ x
0
1− 1
2
γx2
(1 + ψκvx)2
dx− uB + vK
Substitution of K from the second line of equation (11) and then taking both integrals together
results in:
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X = 1−
[
1 + ψκvx
1 + κvx
κv
∫ x
0
W (x)
(1 + ψκvx)2
dx+ uB
]
Solving for the integral and substitution of the definition of u and z yields:
X = u (1−B)− (1 + z)u 1
ψ
1
2
γx2
[
1
1 + z
+ z2 log2 (1 + z)− 2
z
log (1 + z)
]
Using the first line of equation (21) yields:
X = u
1
2
γx2
[
1
ψ
+
1− ψ
ψz
log (1 + z)
[
1
z
log (1 + z)− 2
]]
− (1 + z)u 1
ψ
1
2
γx2
[
1
1 + z
+ z2 log2 (1 + z)− 2
z
log (1 + z)
]
=
1
2
γx2
1
z
log(1 + z)
[
2− 1
z
log(1 + z)
]
This proofs the proposition.
A.8 Proof of Proposition (12)
The second best level of unemployment insurance maximizes the right hand side of equation
(25) with respect to B and subject to equation (18). In order to derive the first order condition
we need to derive the relationship between uand B. This relationship can be derived from the
second equilibrium condition in Proposition 4. Taking total derivatives and using the definition
of f(u) as in equation (3), we find:
du
dB
=
3
2
1
1−B
f(u)
f ′(u)
Using this relationship, it is possible to find that the first order condition of X+with respect to
B reads:
dX+
dB
= − 3u
(1− u)2
1
1−B
f(u)
f ′(u)
[
1 + u
u
log(u) +
log2 u
1− u +
1− u
u
]
(1−B) (31)
+
3
2
1
1−B
f(u)
f ′(u)
B + u+ 2
[
u2
(1− u)2 log u
(
1− u
u
+
1
2
u
)]
Note that the expression for dX+/dB in equation (31) depends only on u and B and is a
continuous function of both variables. Due to the continuity, a proof that a positive level of
B increases welfare is the same as showing that dX+/dB is positive when evaluated at zero.
Figure 9 shows that this is the case for any value of u between zero and one.
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Figure 9: dX
+
dB
evaluated at B = 0 for various values of u.
A.9 Proof of equation (28)
We have:
E [W (0)−W (x) |x ≦ x] =
∫ x
0
[W (0)−W (x)] Ex (x)
E (0)
dx
where Ex (x)is defined in equation (23). The division by E (0)corrects for the unemployed.
Equation (20) implies:
W (0)−W (x) = γ
[
− x
ψκv
[1 + log (1 + ψκvx)]− 1
2
x (x− 2x) + 1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2
log (1 + ψκvx)
]
while equation (23) and (10) implies:
Ex(x)
E(0)
=
1
x
1 + ψκvx
(1 + ψκvx)2
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Substitution yields:
E [W (0)−W (x) |x ≦ x]
= γ
1 + ψκvx
x
∫ x
0
(1 + ψκvx)−2
[
− xψκv [1 + log (1 + ψκvx)]− 12x (x− 2x)
+1+ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2
log (1 + ψκvx)
]
dx
= γ
1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2x2
x2
{
2+ψκvx
1+ψκvx log(1 + κvψx)− 32 ψκvx1+ψκvx
−12 1ψκvx log2(1 + ψκvx)
}
= γu
u+ ψ (1− u)
ψ2 (1− u)2 x
2
{
2u+ψ(1−u)
u+ψ(1−u) log
(
1 + ψ 1−uu
)−
3
2
ψ(1−u)
u+ψ(1−u) − 12 uψ(1−u) log2
(
1 + ψ 1−uu
) }
Using the definition of z we find the first equation of (5). Substitution of the two equations (21)
in equation (24) yields the second equation.
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